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Law  and  Economics,  Consequentialism  and  Legal  Pragmatism:  The 
Influence of Oliver Holmes Jr. 
 
Abstract: This paper aims to present the similarities and differences between Posner's defense of Law 
and Economics (LAE) and Holmes' pragmatism. The investigation is centered in the arguments of 
economic consequences of judicial decisions. Law and Economics tend to emphasize these arguments 
as a determinant characterization of legal pragmatism. These arguments involve some dilemmas: Is it 
possible to eliminate a rule, or reinterpret it according to the effect of its application in practical life? 
May these economic consequences serve as argument for a replacement of traditional interpretation? 
To what extent can we rule out the law with arguments of consequence? Despite the influence, LAE 
has some important differences with respect Holmes' legal pragmatism. Posner's LAE involves the 
economic  principle  of  wealth  maximization  and  its  relations  with  utilitarianism  and  economic 
liberalism.  Consequentialism  in  Holmes,  by  contrast,  is  based  on  a  teleological  interpretation  of 
existing rules. It is important that the judge does not decide based on a specific economic theory. Also, 
legal pragmatism does not advocate abandoning the tenets of positivism that form the basis for the 
rule of law. Holmes defends a judicial restraint. Accordingly, the argument of consequence must have 
previous limits in precedents and statutes. However, both legal pragmatism and LAE are connected by 
the idea that the adaptation of the law to a reasonable end can not be absent from the canons of 
interpretation and adjudication. 
 
I. Introduction 
Legal pragmatism is presented by Richard Posner as a corollary of an economic vision of law, 
so, this paper aims to present the similarities and differences between Posner's defense of law 
and economics and Holmes' legal realism. The investigation is centered in the arguments of 
economic consequences of judicial decisions, which is the basis of a pragmatist view of law, 
according to Posner. This paper is going to examine the alleged proximity between law and 
economics  and Holmes' legal  pragmatism,  showing  also  the differences  between one and 
another. 
The economic approach of Posner defends both a descriptive and a normative thesis. 
According  to  the  first  one,  the  judges  who  forged  the  Common  Law  build  the  law  in 
accordance with the wealth maximization premise. The normative thesis would say that this is 
the best way to decide a legal case. 
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The normative thesis indicates the path of what would be called a “judicial activism”, 
where the consequences of decision are more important than any previous premises (statutes 
or precedents). This paper is concerned specifically with the normative thesis applied to the 
judicial adjudication. 
Herbert  Hart  defines  American  theory  of  law  as  absolutely  centered  on  judicial 
adjudication.  Holmes'  legal  pragmatism  is  an  evident  example.  The  central  concern  of 
Holmes' pragmatism is about what the courts do and how they do. How do the judges really 
decide and reason their decisions in particular cases?
1 
In his paper, The path of the law, Holmes defines law as a whole of prophecies about 
what would judges do in each concrete case.
2  The expression, “legal realism” applied to 
Holmes indicates this vision according to what  law must be understood in reality, not in 
abstract concepts. In other words, the judicial decisions are the reality of law and this reality is 
not  on  abstract  texts,  but  in  the  history  of  judicial  decision.  This  explains  the  similar 
expression in appointing Holmes and Cardozo as legal realists or legal pragmatists. 
In this paper, I will not question the difference between the terms “legal realism” and 
“legal pragmatism”. The attention to psychological themes, a claim for functional attitude and 
a political approach is normally connected to legal realism, rather than legal pragmatism. Also 
some theorists, like Frederic Kellogg and Richard Posner, call Holmes a “legal pragmatist” 
instead of “legal realist”. For the purposes of this paper, the important thing is to compare 
Posner's and Holmes' approaches to judicial adjudication.
3 
The most important difference between Posner and Holmes is what follows. In  spite of 
the pragmatic foundations of Posner's theory of judicial adjudication, we can not justify a 
judicial activism based in economic arguments in Oliver Holmes' legal pragmatism. On the 
contrary, his theory about prediction in law is more concerned about a judicial restraint. 
Consequentialism in Holmes is based on a teleological interpretation of existing rules. It 
is important that the judge does not decide based on a specific economic theory. Also, legal 
pragmatism does not advocate abandoning the tenets of positivism that form the basis for the 
rule of law. 
Holmes argues in favor of the Common Law method and defends an eclectic vision of 
law and its fonts, but legal pragmatism is closer to the idea of a judicial restraint. Some 
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characteristics  of  legal  pragmatism  are  actually  compatible  with  the  proposals  of  legal 
positivism, notably with what Americans call Analytical jurisprudence. 
So,  this  approach  to  Holmes  tends  to  draft  an  objective  view  of  law  and  legal 
adjudication, keeping aside the idea, normally attributed to legal realism, that law is just the 
result of subjective creation of judges or of arguments of public policy. 
 
II. The normative economic approach: discretion and creativity in judicial adjudication 
The central issue that is going to be discussed here is: should be possible to withdraw a statute 
or precedent in favor of a decision based on arguments about economic consequences? The 
rejection of a legal rule should be interpreted as a violation of rule of law? 
Richard  Posner  argues  that  legal  pragmatism  claims  for  an  adjudication  based  on 
analyzing  economic  consequences  of  judicial  decision.  The  basic  assumption  of  law  and 
economics theory is that the individual is a rational maximizer of its own satisfactions. As this 
includes both criminals and parties to a contract, the principle of wealth maximization has 
evident application in law. In its descriptive approach, positive economic analysis of law 
defends that “common law adjudication brings the economic system closer to the results that 
would be produced by effective competition”.
4 
But  the  interest  of  this  paper  is  the  normative  part  of  economic  analysis  of  law.  In 
essence, law and economics theory, in its normative approach, advocates a judicial activism. 
What  does  it  mean?  Judges  should,  in  deciding  hard  cases,  analyze  the  economic 
consequences of their decision, choosing the best public policy, that one which favors wealth 
maximization.  Posner  wrote  that  efficiency  “is  an  adequate  concept  of  justice  that  can 
plausibly be imputed to judges, at least in common law adjudication”.
5  
As  we  note,  this  activism  is  justified  only  in  hard  cases,  when  the  judges  are  more 
accurately seen as policy maker than as a conventional jurist or lawyer. Sometimes, judges are 
as free from previous rules as a traditional politician.
6 
Seeing himself as a pragmatist, Posner tends to affirm the compatibility of his defense of 
wealth maximization with pragmatic postulates. Pragmatism is an empiricist view of law, so, 
it should be easy to accept the interdisciplinar y interference of economics. The economists 
investigates facts to anticipate possible consequences of judicial decisions, which is central to 
a pragmatic analysis.
7 
                                                           
4 Richard Posner. The economics of justice. 1983, p. 5; Richard Posner. Problemas de Filosofia do Direito, 2007, 
473-474. 
5 Richard Posner. The economics of justice. 1983, 6. 
6 Richard Posner. Problemas de Filosofia do Direito, 2007, 175. 
7 Richard Posner. Direito, pragmatismo e democracia, 2010, 60. 4 
He concedes that there are possible questionable ethical consequences in the application 
of wealth maximization principle, mainly when individual guaranties are in opposite side of 
collective  increase  of  wealth.  An  important  critique  to  normative  theory  of  wealth 
maximization is that some political values, like liberty, are extraneous to the idea of wealth 
maximization. Liberty has a value in itself. Regardless the calculus, we choose to live in a 
free society. 
The examples used by Dworkin to criticize wealth maximization are dealing exactly with 
this  initial  distribution  of  rights.  Dworkin  discerns  that  economic  analyzes  of  law,  in  its 
normative approach, may legitimate slavery, if it increases the amount of happiness in society. 
In his example, Agatha is a brilliant writer, but prefers to work in a less remunerative activity. 
If Agatha were a slave, the owner of her labor would compel her to write, increasing the 
wealth of society. This demonstrates that wealth maximization is not a good parameter of 
justice.
8 
Posner's response is his compromise with freedom and its immediate consequences in 
wealth maximization. So, Posner defends that “if Agatha were free she almost certainly could 
– not would – write more detective stories than she would write if she were a slave”.
9 
If this is correct, she would buy her freedom back because her labor as a slave would 
worth much less than it would if she were free. This leads to the argument that, independently 
of  initial  assignment  of  rights,  the  result  would  be  the  same.  To  minimize  the  costs  of 
transactions, it is better to make her free. 
This is, however, a weak argument for a moralist. Therefore, when advocates economic 
freedom and wealth maximization, Posner does not use a moralist argumentation. He rejects 
both libertarianism and egalitarianism. In a pragmatic point of view, it is the experience and 
history that demonstrate the efficiency and triumph of wealth maximization in democratic 
societies.
10 
Hart also highlights the utilitarian influence on economic analysis of law.
11  But  the 
utilitarian approach is partially rejected by Posner: 
 
The  ethics  of  wealth  maximization  can  be  viewed  as  a  blend  of  these  rival  philosophical 
traditions. Wealth is positively correlated, although imperfectly so, with utility, but the pursuit of 
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wealth, based as it is on the model of the voluntary market transaction, involves greater respect 
for individual choice than in classical utilitarianism.
12 
 
So, wealth maximization should be considered a guide. An instrument to support the judge in 
his analysis of policy. But not merely a guide. Common Law facilitates the exchanges and, 
accordingly, wealth maximization is also a social value which serves as reference to criticize 
inefficient law decisions in an economic point of view.  In pragmatic view, judges provide a 
public service. The service of legitimate solution of conflicts. But they provide this service 
not only by applying the legislative rules, but by creating the Common Law.
13 
In creating Common Law, j udges should make a choice between two or more public 
policies. His choice is oriented by the results of researching and evalua tion of consequences 
of alternative options. The consequences involve not only the specific case, but also the rule 
of law and the society as a role. But the strictly juridic material is only used to help 
establishing an initial orientation, providing specific data and as source of limitations of the 
possible policies to be chosen. These serve, nevertheless, for a previous control of judges 
choices.
14 
It is possible to say, in this context, that judges are more prepared than legislators to face 
this challenge. Judges are not exposed to the lobbies that pressure legislators and politicians. 
In this aspect, judicial independence makes legislators more limited than judges. Actually, we 
can not say which one is more constrict. To accept judicial freedom is to acc ept that judges 
are public policies formulators, specially when facing a hard case.  The most important thing 
about pragmatic adjudication is efficiency. To suppress any creative function of the judge is 
to sacrifice efficiency.  This version of Posner's pra gmatism will be m itigated in his later 
writings.
15 
Posner calls the legalistic argument against judicial activism a “pedigree argument”. This 
argument is based on the legitimacy of state in producing law. Since Hobbes, this is the 
essence of legal positivism. Posner seems to understand that basing legitimacy of judicial 
decision in a previous text, like positivism does, or, somehow, also Dworkin does, would be 
an appealing to an specific political theory. The judges are compelled to decide based on 
previous political decisions only in a specific political theory: liberalism. Pedigree approach 
maintains  that  judicial decisions  must  be  observed  because  they  are  reasoned  in  political 
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decisions  of  the  past.  Posner  claims  for  a  different  approach.  Judicial  decisions  must  be 
observed  because  they  are  just.  If  a  statute  or  a  precedent  is  unjust,  a  judicial  decision 
reasoned in these unjust statements would not be considered a just decision.
16 
The question is what follows: how can we achieve the virtues of rule of law  without 
appealing to the pedigree approach? This is the challenge for a contemporary pragmatist 
theory of law. 
Posner's legal pragmatism should be understood as a concern about the future in legal 
adjudication. Contemporary citizens should not be governed  only by decisions made in the 
past. Judges must not forget public opinion about the future in their decisions. It demonstrates 
a clear preference for judicial activism, including in American constitutionalism, when the 
Supreme Court must decide about constitutionality of statutes. 
Pedigree approach has a tendency to separate morals from law in an absolute way. 
According to positivism, moral conceptions must not interfere in judicial decisions, unless 
they are part of the previous texts considered law. But even the pedigree approach must admit 
some spaces of freedom in legal adjudication. This open area enables the application of moral 
principles by judges. As we can see in Harts response to Dworkin in his postscript in  The 
concept of law, this open area is also an “open texture” of legal norms.
17 
In Dworkin, however, this “open texture” is something to criticize in positivism. Moral 
principles are part of law and cannot be excluded by pedigree approach.  This is part of his 
critics about what he calls “the model of rules”. Dworkin advocates that positivism is overly 
arbitrary because of this “open texture”.
18 
The problem is that, in law and in economy, hard cases do not exist on the abstract level 
of norms, but on the application level.  It means that agreement  with economic or juridic 
principles  do  not  guarantee  any  specific  result  of  the  decision  process.  Normally, 
disagreement  is  in  how  the  concrete  case  should  be  viewed  by  the  law.  Concrete  cases 
sometimes involve unforeseen situations.
19 
Posner thinks that an y position that eliminates judicial creativity is dependent of an 
unnecessary idolatry toward the authors of constitutions and statutes. It does not mean that 
judges are better than legislators, but that statutes and constitutions, alone, are not able to 
resolve concrete cases. There is always some space for discretionary decision in law. It is not 
clear how to deduce correct public policies from as general proposition like constitutional 
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principles. Constitutional texts are often representing different political views and this is the 
reality of Brazilian constitution.
20 
Pure positivism leaves no place for debating development of law by judges. That is the 
specific part of legal positivism that pragmatism does not embrace. In pragmatism, the state is 
not the exclusive source of all law and legal rationality.
21 Posner thinks that the environment 
of American law does not embrace legalistic view of interpretation and judicial restraint: 
 
Has we more professional, more disciplined legislative bodies, a constitutional convention in 
continuous  session,  a  federal  commission  to  revise  statutes,  a  counterpart  to  the  Sentencing 
Commission for every area of federal law, then the judges could take a backseat as foreign do. 
But none of these conditions for judicial passivity in interpretation is satisfied.
22 
 
Therefore, in a clear pragmatist attitude, Posner defends formalism only in a forward-looking 
assessment  of  the  consequences.  If  the  environment  was  different,  legalistic  view  of 
interpretation could be used in a pragmatic way. 
Actually, pedigree approach has only a rhetorical function. A rhetoric of certitude. It 
enables social stability. Legalism gives judicial adjudication an apparent intellectual rigor. 
Also, legalism provides a backward looking in judicial adjudication that reflects the state of 
knowledge from the time of promulgation of the statute, precedent or constitution.
23 
 
III. Consequentialism and pragmatism in Oliver Holmes Jr. 
Holmes' pragmatism is also a rejection of legal positivism. Therefore, it is a theory of law 
which defends a socially rooted inquire with important parallels with Peirce's philosophy. It is 
an application even more conservative than that of Dewey or, more recently, of Rorty. 
24 
Consequentialism is connected to the pragmatic tradition in philosophy. With Charles 
Sanders Peirce, pragmatism is described as a philosophy of action. The effects of a given 
object are defined by its practical consequences in reality . As the effects depend on the 
context of action, pragmatism is also an antiessentialism. 
 
It appears, then, that the rule for attaining the third grade of clearness of apprehension is as 
follows: consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the 
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object  of  our  conception  to  have. Then, our conception  of these  effects is the  whole  of our 
conception of the object.
25 
 
So, it is not possible to determine all effects of any object immediately or in the future, 
because the conception of the effects is limited by the context of investigation, historically 
conceived.
26 
Essences and concepts make sense only if they have practical effects in the world. 
Intrinsic characteristics are only characteristics that refers themselves to p ractical effects that 
the object will generate in the environment. Peirce's pragmatism is an empiricism, critical to 
Descartes' thought. For Peirce, the idea is not generated by pure thought, but by facts and 
empiric observation.  There is a clear relation  between pragmatism and a historical and 
experimentalist view connected to scientific method. Pragmatism defends the need to submit 
our intellectual beliefs to experience test, considering all practical consequences that could 
happen.
27 
Belief is, actually, a form of creating a habit. A rule for action. Belief is linked to action. 
In this way, different beliefs distinguish themselves by the different habits they provoke. 
Then,  as  pragmatism  is  a  philosophy  of  action,  it  is  based  on  the  idea  of  practical 
consequences of concepts.
28 
Holmes'  conception  about  consequences  can  be  immediately  connected  to  an 
epistemological posture. We should not describe rights and duties independently of the 
practical consequences of their breach. This is strictly related to Holmes' theory of prediction. 
In The path of the law, Holmes defines law as a whole of prophecies about what would judges 
do in each concrete case along history. This means an evident appeal to consequentialism. 
The law is limited to the predictions about practical consequences of human action. “The 
prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean 
by the law”.
29 
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In Holmes' words: 
 
These are what properly have been called the oracles of the law. Far the most important and 
pretty nearly the whole meaning of every new effort of legal thought is to make these prophecies 
more precise, and to generalize them into a thoroughly connected system.
30 
 
History plays an important part in studying law, because judges and also law students, 
they must reconstruct history of law as a coherence exigency. Each new legal decision is a 
form of continuity. That is why Holmes affirms: “The rational study of law is still to a large 
extent the study of history”.
31 
Nevertheless, pragmatism must spend his time in studying the ends of the law. It is the 
aspect of pragmatism that points to the future. Therefore, Holmes emphasizes the importance 
of economic consequences. In his own words, “As a step toward that ideal it seems to me that 
every lawyer ought to seek an understanding of economics”.
32 And, “The man of the future is 
the man of statistics and the master of economics”
33 
When criticizing legal positivism, Holmes affirms: “You may assume, with Hobbes and 
Bentham and Austin, that all law emanates from the sovereign, even when the first human 
beings to enunciate it are the judges”.
34 Legal positivism enables the fallacy that the only 
force in development of the law is logic. In the beginning of The common law, Holmes says 
that “the life of the law has not been logic, it has been experience”.
35 
Here,  Holmes  explains  the  limits  of  a  positivist  approach  of  law  and  adjudication, 
criticizing the syllogistic method: 
 
The official theory is that each new decision follows syllogistically from existing precedents. (…) 
precedents survive in the law long after the use they once served is at an end and the reason for 
them has been forgotten. The result of following them must often be failure and confusion from 
the merely logical point of view. 
36 
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Every judicial  adjudication is  the result of views  of public policy, not  only deduction of 
general premises. Actually, it also involves the “unconscious result of instinctive preferences 
and inarticulate convictions” but nevertheless “traceable to views of public policy”.
37 
Holmes advocates that pragmatism must first follow the existing body of dogma, then to 
discover from history the reason why it is what it is, and finally, to consider the ends of the 
law and how to accomplish them. The pragmatic man should seek the social consequences of 
law.  The  hole  of  the  judges  involves  “their  duty  of  weighing  considerations  of  social 
advantage”.
38 
Judges have a creative role, but they have to seek some security in the previous texts 
produced by the politicians and by other judges in Common Law. Thus, it is always important 
that judges do not forget their relations with the past. Decisions of the past must conform with 
the present decisions in favor of a historical coherency. It is the need to reconstruct law as 
continuity. 
That  is  why  pragmatism  does  not  exclude  the  validity  of  some  postulates  of  legal 
positivism for the maintenance of democracy. Judicial activism must be limited by decisions 
of  the  past  (statutes  and  precedents).  This  leads  to  a  long-term  consequence  of  social 
advantage, like democracy and the rule of law. It is a form of judicial restraint which will be 
observed by Posner. 
 
IV. The importance of previous authority in pragmatic adjudication: pragmatism is not 
an irrationalism 
The  point  of  major  agreement  between  Posner  and  Holmes  is  viewed  when  the  former 
criticize the authors of  critical  legal  studies.  CLS states  that  law  and  legal  reasoning are 
simply a way to hide or to cover the real political motivation of judicial decisions. Posner says 
that an exaggeration in the interest for subjectivity indicates a neglect of the importance of 
easy cases and an excessive attention to indeterminate cases in law.
39 
When defending that law is not merely what legislators say, Holmes is immediately 
identified with an irrational legal realist, and sometimes he is put in the same side as critical 
legal studies, as a predecessor. Posner, in his later works, just like Holmes, tries to stay away 
from this subjective posture. His economic approach in judicial adjudication is in the half way 
between extreme formalism and absolute irrationality and subjectivity.  
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In spite of consequentialism, judge must not put aside precedents, legislative authorities, 
Constitution and the facts  of lawsuit. Thus, Posner's  later version of pragmatism  is quite 
different from his normative theory of law and economics. 
According to Posner, judges are limited by various circumstances which include the facts 
of  lawsuit,  stare  decisis  and  other  previous  limitations.  So,  the  later  Posner  changes  his 
emphasis, and states that there is a difference between legislators and judges when we talk 
about previous limitation. While legislators are limited by lobby, judges have some limits 
legislators do not have. Logic, coherence of speech, publicity of arguments and reasons for 
decision are also limitations of all judicial adjudication, even on hard cases. As we can see, 
Posner's pragmatism is wider than his normative economic approach. 
40 
Posner says that pragmatism is a better description of judicial behavior because judges 
are more likely to recognize themselves as pragmatist then as an economist. So, it's clear that 
economic analysis of law is just one of the various methods of legal pragmatism.
41 
Hard cases are not the field for irrationality. There is not only one result, but it is possible 
to point to possible and reasonable results. Pragmatism is not able to fill all the open areas of 
law, but it is possible to deal with it. Adjudication may n ot be objective, but it should be 
reasonable. 
Essence  of  pragmatism  is  the  emphasis  on  consequences,  but  it  is  not  a  mere 
consequentialism. Institutional consequences are also important and the decisions of the past 
play an important role in pragmatic adju dication. Pragmatism also balances the systemic 
consequences, and the danger of uncertainty is an important consequence of despising a rule. 
“Definite criteria of pragmatic adjudication is rationality”.
42 
Legal pragmatism in Posner's view has the advantage of recognizing the importance of 
backward looking for coherence and stabilization of social relations, but also it can deal with 
unforeseen  cases  and  changed  circumstances  without  needing  to  wait  for  amendment  of 
statutes or constitution. 
Holmes'  idea  that  law  is  what  the  courts  decide  is  constantly  misinterpreted.  Some 
theorists  affirm  legal  realism  decreases  the  importance  of  some  postulates  of  democracy 
which form the basis of legal positivism, like legality. João Maurício Adeodato says, for 
instance, realism decreases the importance of legislator activity and engenders exacerbation of 
judicial activity.
43 
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Holmes, however, does not abandon the importance of Statute Law. In fact, what Holmes 
intended was  an eclectic theory of law and he never defended complete abandonment of 
legislation. Adeodato's affirmation should be interpreted in this context. Holmes' “realism” is 
pragmatic, and says that law is not only created by legislation. 
 
Taken as a whole, his effort was aimed toward encompassing statute law, and was framed with 
the comprehensive positivist theory of John Austin in mind. It was an extended criticism of 
austinian  positivism,  and an  effort to  present a  unified  theory  of all  law,  accounting  for the 
judicial role in interpreting and applying all forms of law, precedent, statute, and constitution.
44 
 
Even Posner considers that the previous texts of law (statutes  and precedents) have their 
importance in judicial adjudication. Actually, they are the first things to be reached. Only 
after having analyzed the history of the case and examined the precedents and statutes, may 
the  judge  use  a  general  concept  to  point  the  decision  to  the  future.  But  only  after  this 
backward looking, this general concept should be wealth maximization.
45 
Benjamin Cardozo, as well, expresses his concern about codification of law. However, 
codification is not bad in itself. But it is incompatible to the complexity of law and life. 
Absolute codification is just an ideal which can not be accomplished.
46 
Pragmatism is not entirely unconnected to the emergence of rule of law, which made the 
Common Law tradition lose importance for Statute Law. Common Law had to adapt itself to 
constitutionalism. Holmes said once “When we analyze legal interpretation of statutes, the 
inquire is not about what the legislature means, but what the statute means.
47 
Creativeness of judges is not as wide as judicial activism would like.  Judges create law, 
but not to the point of disruption with legislation and precedents. The legal adjudication is a 
complex process, with influence of previous rules and principles, but not just this. It involves 
the  adaptation  of  these  previous  texts  to  the  unforeseen  facts  and  social  needs. 
Consequentialism, thus, is not an authorization for the judge to act like a politician.  
Judicial restraint in Holmes is not based, thus, in observing previous text like legalism or 
positivism.  “Beneath  it  lay  Holmes'  observation  that  the  courtroom  operates  through 
'successive  approximation,'  guided  by  precedent  but  adapting  prior  rules  to  conform  to 
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unanticipated circumstances.”
48 What control judges in a pragmatic sense is a notion of law as 
collective production. History plays an essential role. 
Frederic Kellogg says that: 
 
The  notion  of  restraint  is  thus  not  located  strictly  within  the  legal  or  political  domain,  as  a 
condition of the proper operation of a putative system of governance. Nor is law seen as separate 
and autonomous, as in the dominant school of theory still prevailing in England and America. 
Instead, judicial restraint is seen as a limiting condition of collective inquiry into the conditions of 
social ordering, of which law and governance is a contributing, but not the only, factor, its extent 
and operation to be determined according to the overall success of the project of an ordered 
society.
49 
 
Pragmatic view of law is combined with a historical consensus and will forge the content of 
law. But the consistency of law is also its changing over time. 
However  much  we  may  codify  the  law  into  a  series  of  seemingly  self-sufficient 
propositions, those propositions will be but a phase in a continuous growth. To understand 
their scope fully, to know how they will be dealt with by judges trained in the past which the 
law embodies, we must ourselves know something of that past. The history of what the law 
has been is necessary to the knowledge of what the law is.
50 
In studying law and in legal adjudications, history is determinant. It explains the various 
policy grounds of precedents and statutes in the time they were produced. It is possible for the 
judge do examine if the policy which justified law of the past is still valid to justify law of the 
present and of the future. 
  
V. Separation between law and morals in Holmes' theory 
Holmes is, in another important aspect, away from judicial activism  found in some early 
writings of Richard Posner. There is a skepticism about principles which involves not an 
absolute, but an important separation between law and morals in Holmes' thought. “For his 
skepticism about principles Holmes was posthumously criticized as an amoral authoritarian 
positivist, obscuring his true position”.
51 
Obviously, Holmes is not an “amoral positivist”, but his view about principles puts him 
in the same side of judicial restraint theories rather than judicial activism. 
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The distinction between morals and law is related do his theory of bad man. 
 
If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, who cares only 
for the material consequences witch such knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one, 
who finds his reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions 
of conscience.
52 
 
We have already seen the theory of prediction, according to which “a legal duty so called is 
nothing but a prediction that if a man does or omits certain things he will be made to suffer in 
this or that way”.
53 This means that the “sanctions of conscience” have no interest in law 
because they do not cause any practical consequence. 
This is Holmes' view of morals, considered only in its subjective sense. Even the moral 
concepts present in law must be interpreted in the pragmatic point of view. The bad man does 
not care about the abstractions, principles, axioms or deductions in law. He cares only to 
know about the real courts decisions. 
This  is  a  form  of skepticism about  general propositions.  It  is  linked to the fact that 
pragmatism believes general propositions are not able, alone, to resolve concrete cases. The 
history and facts of the case are the elements to inform judges, not some general principle. In 
his  dissent  in  Lochner  case  Holmes  wrote:  “General  propositions  do  not  decide  concrete 
cases. The decision will depend on a judgment or intuition more subtle than any articulate 
major premise”.
54 
Principles  are  also  general  propositions  and  they  cannot  reason  a  hard  case  decision 
because they involve unforeseen cases and special social circumstances. The use of arguments 
based on general propositions of moral kind hides the true reason of decision. It is in this 
sense that Holmes defends that law can only be apprehended in concrete reality. 
As we have already said, hard cases do not exist on the abstract level of norms, but on the 
application level. So, agreement with principles does not guarantee any specific decision. 
Legal reasoning needs more that mere appealing to principle. 
This advice is specially destined to the activism of USA Supreme Court when judging 
labor  cases.  The  fear  of  the  word  “socialism”  led  many  to  ignore  demands  for  social 
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legislation. Holmes defends a judicial restraint in these economic themes, as to provide a 
social experimentation before judging its constitutionality. 
A clear example is Lochner v. New York: 
 
Some of these laws embody convictions or prejudices which judges are likely to share. Some may 
not.  But  a  Constitution  is  not  intended  to  embody  a  particular  economic  theory,  whether  of 
paternalism and the organic relations of the citizen to the State or of laissez faire.
55 
 
This interpretation of judicial adjudication puts the contemporary followers of Holmes in the 
opposite  side  of  Posner's  defense  of  an  economic  approach.  But  Holmes  emphasizes  the 
danger of subjectivity, with which Posner would certainly agree. Policy is a more objective 
way of legal reasoning than moral principles or specific economic theories. That is the place 
Posner wants for “wealth maximization”: an objective guide. 
The rejection of principle is not an absolute incompatibility with wealth maximization 
principle, but a different focus in analyzing social consequences: 
 
Holmes rejected judicial appeal to “principle” as a dereliction of the judicial role. This was to step 
entirely away from the delicate process of building or rebuilding transgenerational consensus. 
Such was the import of his constant critique of moral language, notable in “The Path of the 
Law”.
56 
 
So,  Posner's  economic  analysis  of  law  is  not  opposed  to  Holmes  concerns  about  moral 
subjectivity. But his emphasis is different. Although it must be said that, about economic 
approach,  Holmes  was  specifically  concerned.  A  form  of  moral  skepticism,  Holmes' 
pragmatic view of judicial adjudication avoids introducing ideology into legal argumentation. 
Holmes resisted in accepting introducing economic liberalism theories as a competent reason 
for deciding constitutional cases.
57 
It is important to have “a cautionary approach to judicial policy where no clear path has 
yet been publicly sanctioned”.
58 When there is no consensus about what policy is lawful, 
especially in judging constitutionality of statutes, judges should wait. 
Posner is also careful to recognize pragmatism as merely an economic approach: 
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As a normative theory, economic analysis of law is controversial. A judge's choice to use it to 
generate outcomes in the open area is an ideological choice except when there is broad agreement 
that economics should guide then decision; consensus represses ideological conflict.
59 
 
So, except when the path is already drawn, the judge may not impose his ideology. Holmes' 
legal  realism  (or  pragmatism)  is  a  clear  limitation  to  the  use  of  normative  postulates  of 
economic analysis of law. In his essay Law and the court, Holmes defends that judge must not 
impose his sympathy for a moral doctrine: 
 
As law embodies beliefs that have triumphed in the battle of ideas and then have translated 
themselves into action while there still is doubt, while opposite convictions still keep a battle 
front against each other, the time for law has not come; the notion destined to prevail or not yet 
entitled to the field. It is a misfortune if a judge reads his conscious or unconscious sympathy 
with one side or the other prematurely into the law, and forgets that what seem to him to be first 
principles are believed by half his fellow men to be wrong.
60 
 
That  is  why judges  should  not  read his  conscious  or unconscious sympathy  for  a moral, 
political or economic doctrine. It does not mean that moral values are not part of law. It 
means that judges should not import their own “subjective values under the abstract language 
of rights”.
61 
  
IV. Conclusion 
1. Economic analysis of law has a normative approach which argues for a judicial activism 
based  on  economic  consequences  of  law.  According  to  that,  judges  should  analyze  the 
economic consequences of their decision choosing the public policy  which favors  wealth 
maximization. So, wealth maximization should be considered a guide for legal adjudication. 
 
2.  Posner  believes  in  judicial  creativity  and  criticizes  legal  positivism  as  an  unnecessary 
idolatry toward the authors of constitutions and statutes. It does not mean that judges are 
better  than  legislators,  but  that  statutes  and  constitutions,  alone,  are  not  able  to  resolve 
concrete cases. 
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3. Holmes has a similar view. He argues in favor of a Common Law method and an eclectic 
vision of law.  Holmes argues that legal positivism enables the fallacy that the only force in 
development of the law is logic and explains the limits of a positivist approach of law and 
adjudication, criticizing the syllogistic method. 
 
4. But Holmes' legal realism is closer to the idea of a judicial restraint. Some characteristics of 
legal pragmatism are actually compatible with the proposals of legal positivism, notably the 
defense of rationality. Hard cases are not the field for irrationality. Pragmatism can not fill all 
the open areas of law, but it can deal with it. So, adjudication may not be objective, but is 
should be reasonable. 
 
5. That is why in spite of its emphasis on consequences, Holmes legal realism is not a mere 
consequentialism.  Decisions  of  the  past  play  an  important  role  in  pragmatic  adjudication 
because  institutional  and  systemic  consequences  are  also  important.  Danger  of  law 
uncertainty is an important consequence to be considered in despising a rule. 
 
6. In his approximation of judicial restraint, Holmes advocates that general propositions can 
not reason a hard case decision because hard cases involve unforeseen situation and special 
social circumstances. The use of arguments based on general propositions of moral kind hides 
true  reason  of  decision.  Thus,  Holmes  defends  law  can  only  be  apprehended  in  concrete 
reality. 
 
7. Posner also considers that statutes and precedents are important in judicial adjudication. 
Only after having analyzed the history of the case and examined the precedents and statutes, 
may the judge use wealth maximization as a general concept to point the decision to the best 
public policy. 
 
8. But Holmes' legal realism (or pragmatism) is a clear limitation to the use of normative 
postulates of economic analysis of law, because judges must not impose his sympathy for a 
moral, politic or economic doctrine. Pragmatism is wider than a merely economic approach. 
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